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Business Associations
by Paul A. Quir6s
Lynn S. Scott*
and Jane E. Ledlie'
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys noteworthy cases in the area of corporate, limited
liability company, partnership, agency, and joint venture law decided
between June 1, 2010 and May 31, 2011, by the Georgia Supreme Court,
the Georgia Court of Appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, and the United States District Courts located in
Georgia.' In addition, this Article provides an overview of important
enactments during the 2011 session of the Georgia General Assembly to
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) with respect to
banking, finance, contracts, corporation, partnership, and business
associations statutes.

* Partner in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Furman University
(B.A., cum laude, 1979); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 1982).
Member, Mercer Law Review (1980-1982); Lead Articles II Editor (1981-1982). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of Arnall Golden Gregory LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.S., 1971); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., magna cum
laude, 1988). Member, Mercer Law Review (1986-1988); Research Editor (1987-1988).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Arnall Golden Gregory LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Washington
and Lee University (B.A. & B.S., magna cum laude, 2003); Washington and Lee University
School of Law (J.D., 2008). Member, State Bars of Virginia and Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia business associations law during the prior survey period,
see Paul A. Quir6s et al., Business Associations,Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 62 MERCER
L. REV. 41 (2010).
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CORPORATIONS

Issues of FirstImpression

1. Court of Appeals Holds that a Dissolved Corporation Could
Not Initiate a Negligence Action After Expiration of Statutory
Period for Asserting Claims. In GC Quality Lubricants, Inc. v.
Doherty, Duggan & Rouse Insurors,2 the Georgia Court of Appeals
examined an issue of first impression in Georgia-whether a dissolved
corporation may initiate a negligence action after the expiration of the
statutory period for asserting the claims of a dissolved corporation.' On
February 11, 2005, GC Quality Lubricants, Inc. (GC) claimed an
electrical storm damaged its office equipment. On July 9, 2005, the
Georgia Secretary of State (the secretary) administratively dissolved GC
because GC had failed to pay its annual fees. On February 15, 2008, GC
filed suit against Doherty, Duggan & Rouse Insurors and Georgia Power
Company (the defendants). GC asserted that it was a Georgia corporation and alleged that the defendants were liable for the damaged office
equipment. Almost four years after its dissolution, on April 28, 2009,
the secretary granted GC's application for reinstatement of the dissolved
corporation.4
In March 2008, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment
based on O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1410,5 the two-year survival statute that
allows a dissolved corporation to assert claims.' The defendants argued
that the two years for GC to assert a claim had expired on July 9, 2007,
two years after the secretary dissolved GC on July 9, 2005.' In its
response to the motion, GC argued that the language of O.C.G.A. § 14-21422(d)? controlled; thus, GC's lawsuit was validly filed due to the
secretary's reinstatement.9
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1422(d),
"[w] hen the reinstatement is effective, it relates back to and takes effect
as of the effective date of the administrative dissolution and the

2.
3.
4.
5.

304 Ga. App. 767, 697 S.E.2d 871 (2010).
Id. at 769, 697 S.E.2d at 872.
Id. at 767-68, 697 S.E.2d at 871-72.
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1410 (2003).

6.

GC Quality Lubricants, 304 Ga. App. at 768, 697 S.E.2d at 872; see also O.C.G.A.

§ 14-2-1410.
7.

GC Quality Lubricants, 304 Ga. App. at 768, 697 S.E.2d at 872.

8.
9.

O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1422(d) (2003 & Supp. 2011).
GC Quality Lubricants, 304 Ga. App. at 768, 697 S.E.2d at 872.
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corporation resumes carrying on its business as if the administrative
dissolution had never occurred.""o
In relying on O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1410, the trial court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment because a lawsuit filed by a
corporation while it is administratively dissolved must be within two
Further, the trial court found that
years of dissolution to be valid."
the four-year statute of limitation for the property damage claims had
expired on February 11, 2009, before GC was reinstated or filed a valid
lawsuit.12 In rejecting GC's interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1422(d),
the trial court noted such an understanding of that statute would render
the two-year survival statute, O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1410, meaningless.
In affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeals stated the
issue on appeal was whether a lawsuit for which a corporation lacked
capacity to file at the time of its filing was rendered valid by the
secretary's reinstatement of that corporation.14 The court of appeals
determined the lawsuit was a legal nullity since GC lacked capacity to
bring the action after the running of the two-year survival statute."'
Thus, "there was no lawsuit to validate, amend, or revise" upon GC's
reinstatement in April 2009.16 Further, the court of appeals stated that
the running of the four-year statute of limitation before GC obtained
reinstatement resulted in GC's failure to bring a valid lawsuit for the
property damage claims." The court of appeals stated that holding
otherwise would improperly extend the four-year statute of limitation.'
The decision in GC Quality Lubricants is important because it serves
as a reminder to Georgia corporations and the counsel that serve them
of the importance of both maintaining the corporation's status with the
secretary as well as keeping track of the statutes of limitations for
potential claims.

2. Court of Appeals Opines that Statute Permitting a Corporation to Limit Minority Shareholders' Right of Inspection
Abrogates Any Common Law Right of Inspection. In Mannato v.

10. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1422(d).
11. GC Quality Lubricants, 304 Ga. App. at 768, 697 S.E.2d at 872; see also O.C.G.A.
§ 14-2-1410.
12. GC Quality Lubricants, 304 Ga. App. at 768, 697 S.E.2d at 872.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 769, 697 S.E.2d at 872.
15. Id. at 770, 697 S.E.2d at 873.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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SunTrust Banks, Inc.,19 the court of appeals, in another case of first
impression, ruled that a Georgia statute permitting corporations to limit
shareholder access to its corporate records replaced any common law
20
In March of
right a shareholder had to inspect corporate records.
to take
(SunTrust)
Inc.
2008, Edward Mannato asked SunTrust Banks,
duty
of
fiduciary
legal action against its officers and directors for breach
in connection with the housing market collapse. In a written response
to Mannato, SunTrust's board of directors denied the request. SunTrust
informed Mannato that, following an independent investigation by a
special committee and independent counsel, it determined Mannato's
claims had no factual basis, and litigation against its officers and
directors would not be in the best interest of SunTrust. 21
Mannato then attempted to use his position as a shareholder of
SunTrust to inspect and copy SunTrust's books and records." Because
Mannato's shares of SunTrust's totaled less than two percent, SunTrust's
counsel refused the demand pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602(e)2 3 and
In an effort to enjoin SunTrust from
SunTrust's own bylaws."
continuing its refusal to allow him access, Mannato filed a complaint in
equity. SunTrust moved to have the complaint dismissed because only
a shareholder owning more than two percent of SunTrust's shares was
permitted access to its books and records.25 In granting SunTrust's
motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded that "[O.C.G.A.] § 14-21602(e) permits corporations to limit the right to inspect certain
corporate records and books to shareholders owning more than two
percent of the corporation's outstanding shares."2 6
On appeal, Mannato argued that the enactment of O.C.G.A. § 14-21602(e) did not abrogate the Georgia common law right of all shareholders to inspect corporate books and records.27 After reviewing documentation from the legislative session in which O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602(e) was
passed, the court of appeals disagreed with Mannato, determining that
"the General Assembly intended to supersede any common law rights of

19.
20.
2011).
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

308 Ga. App. 691, 708 S.E.2d 611 (2011).
Id. at 693, 708 S.E.2d at 612-13; see also O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602(e) (2003 & Supp.
Mannato, 308 Ga. App. at 691, 708 S.E.2d at 612.
Id. at 691-92, 708 S.E.2d at 612.
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602(e) (Supp. 2011).
Mannato, 308 Ga. App. at 692, 708 S.E.2d at 612.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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inspection with the passage of [the statute]."2 8 Holding otherwise, the
29
court concluded, would render O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602(e) meaningless.

B.

Shareholder Rights

1. A Shareholder May Only Bring a Direct Action Against
Shareholders Instead of a Derivative Action Against a Closely
Held Corporation in the Case of a Special Injury or When the
Reasons for Bringing a Derivative Action Do Not Apply. In
Barnett v. Fullard,aothe court of appeals held that a shareholder lacked
standing to bring his claims in a direct action against individual
shareholders, instead of a derivative action against the corporation."
Stephen Barnett, a minority shareholder in Earthwise Industries, Inc.
(Earthwise), a closely held Georgia corporation, brought suit against
Earthwise and its three corporate directors-Andrew Fullard, Adena
Fullard, and Jane Hix (collectively, Fullard)-who also comprised the
majority shareholders of Earthwise. Subsequently, Barnett voluntarily
dismissed Earthwise as a defendant and pursued his lawsuit against
Fullard.3 2 Barnett alleged that Fullard
refus[ed Barnett'sl demand to inspect corporate records[,] .

..

misap-

propriated corporate assets for [defendants'] personal use and for a
rival business solely controlled by one of the defendants[, ...
inappropriately altered the corporate books and records to disguise the
misappropriations[,] and ... failed to account for corporate income
attributed to [Barnett] in corporate tax filings or distribute the income
to [Barnett]."

Fullard filed a motion to dismiss based on a failure to state a claim,
arguing that a direct action against the individuals was inappropriate.
Agreeing with Fullard, the trial court granted Fullard's motion and

28. Id. at 693, 708 S.E.2d at 612-13. Documentation of that legislative session showed
that proponents of O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602(e) sought to prevent "harassment of corporations
by shareholders who own relatively small interests" in the hopes of keeping Georgia a
"probusiness state." Id. at 693, 708 S.E.2d at 612 (internal quotation marks omitted); K.
Barfield, Recent Development, Corporations,Partnerships,and Associations, 5 GA. ST. U.
L. REv. 285, 298-300 (1988).
29. Mannato, 308 Ga. App. at 693, 708 S.E.2d at 613.
30. 306 Ga. App. 148, 701 S.E.2d 608 (2010).
31. Id. at 148, 701 S.E.2d at 610. However, the court of appeals held that a direct
action could be pursued against shareholder defendants when those defendants fail to
account for and pay corporate income. Id.
32. Id. at 149, 701 S.E.2d at 610.
33. Id.
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dismissed Barnett's complaint. The court of appeals, in affirming the
trial court's ruling on every claim except one," determined that Barnett
should have brought all such claims in a derivative action against the
corporation, not in a direct action against the defendants as individuals."
A shareholder has standing to bring a direct action only if the
shareholder can allege either "a special injury separate and distinct from
that suffered by other shareholders" 7 or that the reasons for requiring
a derivative action are inapplicable.3 ' Because Barnett failed to allege
a special injury separate and distinct from other shareholders, the court
looked closely at whether the general rule requiring a derivative suit
applied in this situation." The general reasons for requiring derivative
suits are as follows:
(1) to prevent multiple suits by shareholders; (2) to protect corporate
creditors by ensuring that the recovery goes to the corporation; (3) to
protect the interest of all the shareholders by ensuring that the
recovery goes to the corporation, rather than allowing recovery by one
or a few shareholders to the prejudice of others; and (4) to adequately
compensate injured shareholders by increasing their share values.40
The court of appeals noted that because this suit did not include all of
the Earthwise shareholders, a possibility of multiple lawsuits existed
with a possible prejudice to the nonparty shareholders." The closely
held corporation exception 42 to derivative lawsuits was therefore
inapplicable in this case, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the remaining claims.4

34. Id. at 149, 701 S.E.2d at 610-11.
35. See id. at 154, 701 S.E.2d at 614. The court of appeals determined that Barnett
alleged a "special injury" as to that claim and, thus, had standing to bring that claim in
a direct action. Id.
36. Id. at 150-54, 701 S.E.2d at 611-13.
37. Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 286 Ga. App. 61, 64, 648 S.E.2d 399, 403 (2007) (quoting
Stoker v. Bellemeade, LLC, 272 Ga. App. 817, 822, 615 S.E.2d 1, 7 (2005)).
38. Id. (quoting Sw. Health & Wellness, LLC v. Work, 282 Ga. App. 619, 626, 639
S.E.2d 570, 577 (2006)).
39. Barnett, 306 Ga. App. at 152-53, 701 S.E.2d at 612-13.
40. Sw. Health & Wellness, LLC v. Work, 282 Ga. App. 619, 626, 639 S.E.2d 570, 577
(2006).
41. Barnett, 306 Ga. App. at 153, 701 S.E.2d at 613.
42. This exception applies when the corporation is closely held and the reasons for
requiring a derivative action do not apply. Id. (quoting Sw. Health, 282 Ga. App. at 626,
639 S.E.2d at 577).
43. Id. at 153-54, 701 S.E.2d at 613.

2011]

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

89

2. Georgia Court of Appeals Determined Oral Agreement
Between Parties Constituted a Waiver of Contradictory Buyout
Provisions in Shareholder Agreement. In Ansley v. Ansley," the
court of appeals ruled against the administrator of a shareholder's estate
seeking to enforce the provisions of a shareholders agreement between
the deceased and two other shareholders.4 5 In so ruling, the court
determined that a trier of fact could have found the oral agreement
between the shareholders, including the deceased, constituted a waiver
of the deceased shareholder's right to the buyout provision of the written
shareholders agreement.
In 1992, Jeffrey, Michelle, and Kevin Ansley (the Ansleys) acquired
Ansley & Sutton Construction Company, Inc. (A&S), each becoming onethird shareholders. The same day, the Ansleys and A&S entered into an
addendum (the 1992 Shareholders Agreement) to the shareholders
agreement signed by A&S and its two original shareholders in 1987 (the
1987 Shareholders Agreement).4 7
Under the 1992 Shareholders
Agreement, the three shareholders agreed to be bound by the terms of
the 1987 Shareholders Agreement, which contained a buyout provision
for the stock of a deceased shareholder. 4 8 In 1994, one of the shareholders, Jeffrey, executed a will bequeathing his shares in A&S to the
other two shareholders, both of whom expressed their desire to execute
wills with a similar provision, although only Michelle did so. In January
2008, the three shareholders all signed minutes to express their desire
that A&S remain viable. To ensure the company's viability, the Ansleys
agreed to update their wills by December 2008 to provide that no spouse
or child would possess an interest in A&S (the 2008 Shareholders
Agreement). However, Kevin died in August 2008 without a will.49
The administrator sued A&S and the other two shareholders for
failing to adhere to the buyout provisions of the 1987 Shareholders
Agreement, as adopted by the 1992 Shareholders Agreement." A&S,
Jeffrey, and Michelle claimed that the 1992 Shareholders Agreement
was no longer valid, relying on O.C.G.A. § 14-2-732(b)(3)," "which
provides that an agreement authorized by that [clode section is valid for

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

307 Ga. App. 388, 705 S.E.2d 289 (2010).
Id. at 388, 705 S.E.2d at 291.
Id. at 393, 705 S.E.2d at 294.
Id. at 389, 705 S.E.2d at 291-92.
Id.
Id. at 389-90, 705 S.E.2d at 292.
Id. at 390, 705 S.E.2d at 292.
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-732(b)(3) (2003).

90

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

no more than [twenty] years."52 Further, they alleged that because the
original shareholders agreement adopted in 1987 was silent as to its
expiration, its terms, as adopted by the 1992 Shareholders Agreement,
expired in 2007.5' The court of appeals disagreed, refusing to alter the
1987 agreement by adding a material term when the agreement was
later adopted by different parties."
However, the court of appeals did rule in the defendants' favor in
asserting that the oral agreement to make a will could not fall within
the parol evidence rule because it was independent of and distinct from
the written 2008 Shareholders Agreement." Further, the court of
appeals asserted that sufficient evidence existed to establish that,
instead of following the buyout provisions of the 1992 Shareholders
Agreement, all of the current shareholders intended to devise their
shares." Thus, it was possible for a trier of fact to conclude that Kevin
waived his rights to the buyout provisions under the 1992 Shareholders
Agreement when assenting to the oral agreement to devise his shares in
a different manner."
This case stands as a reminder of the importance of reviewing and
updating shareholders agreements, especially when time has passed and
new agreements have been reached by the shareholders that may be
contrary to the signed agreements. Additionally, the twenty-year term
of a shareholder agreement, as set forth in O.C.G.A. § 14-2-732(b)(3),
should be managed by the clients and counsel appropriately.
3. Georgia Court of Appeals Determines a Professional
Corporation Must Follow Statutory Provisions Regarding
Making a Valid Offer of Payment for Redemption of Shares. In
Rakusin v. Radiology Associates, P.C.," the court of appeals overturned
the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to the defendant
based on its finding that there was no valid offer of payment for a
deceased shareholder's shares." The plaintiff, Lee A. Rakusin, was
"the personal representative and execut [orl of the estate of her late
husband," an employee and stockholder of the defendant, Radiology

52. Ansley, 307 Ga. App. at 390, 705 S.E.2d at 292; see also O.C.G.A. § 14-2-732(b)(3).
53. Ansley, 307 Ga. App. at 390-91, 705 S.E.2d at 292.
54. Id. at 391, 705 S.E.2d at 292-93.
55. Id. at 392, 705 S.E.2d at 294.
56. Id. at 393, 705 S.E.2d at 294.
57. Id. "Waiver of a contract right may result from a party's conduct showing his
election between two inconsistent rights." Kusuma v. Metametrix, Inc., 191 Ga. App. 255,
257, 381 S.E.2d 322, 324 (1989) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. 305 Ga. App. 175, 699 S.E.2d 384 (2010).
59. Id. at 175, 699 S.E.2d at 385.
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The record
Associates of Atlanta, P.C. (Radiology Associates). 60
established that "[tihe decedent's shares were not subject to any article
of incorporation, bylaw provision, or contractual agreement providing for
Thus, O.C.G.A. § 14-7the redemption . . . of [those] shares . . . ."'
5(c)62 of the Georgia Professional Corporation Act" applied, which
states that if the corporation and executor of the shareholder's estate
have failed to reach an agreement "on the terms of valuation and
payment for the decedent's shares, 'the fair value of the . . . shares shall

be determined and paid"' as if O.C.G.A. § 14-2-132764 (dissenters'
rights) applies." The dissenters rights' sections provide for the start
of the valuation process upon a professional corporation making an offer
of payment.
At issue in Rakusin was whether Radiology Associates' offer of
payment was validly made.6 ' Radiology Associates sent the executor
two checks dated February 28, 2007, one noted as "1500 Shares of RAA
Stock Repurchase," and the other noted as "Accounts Receivable BuyOut."6 8 The executor did not cash either check.6 9 In a letter sent on
August 15, 2007 (the August 15 letter), by the attorney for Radiology
Associates to the executor's attorney, Radiology Associates stated that
the two checks sent to the executor amounted to the fair value of her
late husband's shares in Radiology Associates and that she "had the
right to respond by making a demand for payment under [O.C.G.A.]
§ 14-2-1327."'o The attorney for Radiology Associates enclosed a copy
of the dissenters' rights provision of the Georgia Business Corporation
Code with the August 15 letter.
The executor's attorney responded
with a letter on September 25, 2008 (the September 25 letter), in which
the executor estimated a higher fair value of the decedent's shares and
demanded payment of that amount.7 2 The letter further claimed that
Radiology Associates failed to comply with the provisions in O.C.G.A.

60. Id.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 176, 699 S.E.2d at 386.
O.C.G.A. § 14-7-5(c) (2003).
O.C.G.A. tit. 14, ch. 7 (2003 & Supp. 2011).
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1327 (2003).

65. Rakusin, 305 Ga. App. at 176, 699 S.E.2d at 386 (alteration in original); see also
§ 14-7-5(c).
66. Rakusin, 305 Ga. App. at 176, 699 S.E.2d at 386; see also O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-1325,

O.C.G.A.

1327 (2003).

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See Rakusin, 305 Ga. App. at 175, 699 S.E.2d at 385.
Id. at 176, 699 S.E.2d at 386 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 177, 699 S.E.2d at 386.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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§ 14-2-1325 7 and that the executor was making a timely demand for
payment.74 Radiology Associates' attorney denied this claim, maintaining that the demand for payment was not timely and was not a fair
value estimate of the decedent's shares." Radiology Associates then
commenced this action to determine the value of the shares, asserting
that "the execut[or]'s failure to respond to [Radiology Associates'] offer
within the 30-day statutory deadline barred [the executor's] claims for
7
payment in excess of the amount [Radiology Associates] had offered."
The executor argued, and the court of appeals agreed, that the checks
sent by Radiology Associates in February 2007 did not constitute a valid
offer of payment because O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1325(b) clearly states that "an
offer of payment 'must be accompanied by' certain information and
Therefore, Radiology Associates' sending of the two
documents."
checks in February 2007 without the required documentation (until the
August 15 letter) did not meet the statutory requirements for a valid
offer of payment under the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1325(b).
The court of appeals declined to accept Radiology Associates' argument
that a substantial compliance standard should apply to O.C.G.A. § 14-21325 because the requirements of the statute are such that the failure
to adhere to them (that is, failure to include certain information and
documents) invalidates the offer of payment.7 ' The court also rejected
Radiology Associates' argument that the August 15 letter constituted a
valid offer of payment because that letter did not contain an offer but
merely referenced the checks sent in February 2007.80 The court
decided the August 15 letter was nothing more than a late attempt by
Radiology Associates to supply the information required at the time
Radiology Associates sent the two checks.8 1 Thus, Radiology Associates'
failure to comply with O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1325 freed the executor from
being bound by the thirty-day statutory demand period. 2 Therefore,
her demand for payment in the September 25 letter was not untimely.8

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1325 (2003).
Rakusin, 305 Ga. App. at 177, 699 S.E.2d at 386.
Id. at 177, 699 S.E.2d at 386-87.
Id. at 177, 699 S.E.2d at 387.
Id. at 178, 699 S.E.2d at 387; see also O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1325(b).
Rakusin, 305 Ga. App. at 178, 699 S.E.2d at 387.
Id. at 180-81, 699 S.E.2d at 389.
Id. at 181, 699 S.E.2d at 389.

81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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CorporateFormalities

1.
Piercing the Corporate Veil. In its denial of summary
judgment for the defendants in GuaranteeInsurance Co. v. Merchants
Employer Benefits, Inc.," the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia determined that genuine issues of material
fact existed as to whether Jimmy Selph, the sole owner of Merchants
Employer Benefits, Inc. (Merchants), used Merchants as an alter ego
without due regard for its separate corporate identity."
A plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil under Georgia law must
show three things:
[(1)] that the stockholders' disregard of the corporate entity made it a
mere instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs; [(2)] that
there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the owners no longer exist; and [(3)
that] to adhere to the doctrine of the corporate entity would promote
injustice or protect fraud.'
The district court determined the evidence submitted by the plaintiff,
Guarantee Insurance Company (Guarantee), in support of its piercing
claim, was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact."
Further, a reasonable jury could find that Selph used Merchants, along
with the other corporations he solely owned, for his own personal affairs,
often using money from one corporation as reimbursement for expenses
or repayment of loans to the other corporations." Selph also used the
premium payments from clients of Merchants to finance a new business."9 All of these factors led the district court to deny Merchants's
and Selph's motions for summary judgment, concluding that a jury could
determine that Selph ignored the Merchants's separate corporate
identity, using it instead "as an instrumentality to transact his own
affairs, in such a way as to defeat justice or evade contractual responsibilities."9o

84. No. 5:07-cv-307(CAR), 2010 WL 3937325 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2010).
85. Id. at *1, *11.
86. Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, Inc., 194 Ga. App. 840,844, 392 S.E.2d 37,
40 (1990) (quoting TransAmerican Commc'ns v. Nolle, 134 Ga. App. 457, 460, 214 S.E.2d
717, 719 (1975)).
87. GuaranteeIns. Co., 2010 WL 3937325, at *10.
88. Id. at *11.
89.

Id.

90. Id. Despite losing their motions for summary judgment on the piercing claim,
Merchants and Selph were granted summary judgment on Guarantee's responsible
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2. The Georgia Court of Appeals Ruled that the Parent
Company Was Not Liable for Its Subsidiaries' Alleged Negligence. The importance of adhering to corporate formalities in order to
preserve the separate identities of corporations was apparent in Ramcke
v. Georgia Power Co.," in which the court of appeals affirmed the
superior court's decision to grant a directed verdict in favor of the
defendants, Georgia Power, Southern Company Services, Inc., and
Southern Company." The plaintiff, Edna Ramcke, alleged all three
defendants were liable for the death of Robert Podorsky, who died after
being struck by a piece of equipment while working on a project site
owned by Georgia Power."
Georgia Power, a subsidiary of Southern Company that owned the
premises where the accident occurred, entered into an independent
contractor relationship with the company that operated the equipment.
Another subsidiary of Southern Company, Southern Company Services,
designed the project and drafted the contract between the independent
contractor and Georgia Power.94 Ramcke brought a premises liability
claim against all three defendants, alleging that all three occupied the
project premises as part of "a joint venture, or as ... agents of one
another, to enforce the contract" with the independent contractor.95
The trial court determined, and the court of appeals affirmed, that
there was no evidence that Southern Company, the parent company of
the other two defendants, owned or occupied the project premises and
that it was not liable for alleged negligent actions on the premises taken
by its corporate subsidiaries." The court of appeals, like the trial
courts, also determined there was no evidence that Southern Company
exercised any control over work on the project." Furthermore, because
Georgia Power and Southern Company Services, Inc. were subsidiaries
with legal identities separate from their parent corporation, the court of

corporate officer claim. Id. at *12. Guarantee sought to impose personal liability on Selph
as the corporate officer responsible for Merchants's breach of contract with Guarantee. Id.
The district court ruled, however, that "[t]he 'responsible corporate officer' theory is applied
only in tort cases," where a corporation's officer who personally takes part in a tort
committed by the corporation may be held personally liable. Id. Thus, the court was not
inclined to broaden the application of the theory to breach of contract cases. See id.
91. 306 Ga. App. 736, 703 S.E.2d 13 (2010).
92. Id. at 736, 703 S.E.2d at 14-15.
93. Id. at 736, 703 S.E.2d at 14.
94. Id. at 737, 703 S.E.2d at 15.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 738, 703 S.E.2d at 16.
97. Id.
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appeals held that Southern Company was not liable for their alleged
Southern Company could, however, be liable for the
negligence."
negligence of its subsidiaries under a theory of "(1) piercing the
corporate veil; (2) apparent or ostensible agency; or (3) joint venture,"
but because the plaintiff asserted no evidence to support a piercing,
agency, or joint venture claim, the court of appeals determined the trial
court did not err in directing a verdict in its favor."
III.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES

A. Merger Clause in OperatingAgreement Bars Member from
Bringing Tort Claims Regarding Negotiationsof OperatingAgreement
Provisions
0
o the court of appeals held that the
In Giacomantonio v. Romagnoli,'
involuntary withdrawal provisions in a limited liability company's
operating agreements were enforceable against a member, and the
presence of a merger clause in the agreements barred the member from
bringing tort claims against the other members for precontract
discussions of the provisions in the operating agreement.'0 1 The court
found the undisputed record revealed that while going through a divorce
in 2003, Mirko di Giacomantonio, one of the owners of three separate
companies with Sandro Romagnoli and Irven Penn, sold his interest in
two of the companies to Romagnoli and Penn to prevent his wife from
obtaining an ownership interest in those two companies. In the
settlement agreement between Giacomantonio and his wife made as part
of the divorce, Giacomantonio agreed that if he should acquire an
ownership interest in the two companies within three years of the final
judgment and decree of divorce (February 28, 2005), his wife would be
entitled to half of that interest. 102
In 2007, Giacomantonio, Romagnoli, and Penn restructured the
ownership of the three companies such that all three men became partowners and each became a part-owner of three new limited liability
companies (LLCs), each subject to a separate operating agreement

98. Id.
99. Id. at 739, 703 S.E.2d at 16 (quoting Matson v. Noble Inv. Grp., LLC, 288 Ga. App.
650, 658, 655 S.E.2d 275, 282 (2007)). The court of appeals also upheld the trial court's
directed verdict in favor of Georgia Power and Southern Company Services on the premises
liability claim. Id. at 739-40, 703 S.E.2d at 16-17.
100. 306 Ga. App. 26, 701 S.E.2d 510 (2010).
101. Id. at 26, 32, 701 S.E.2d at 512, 515-16.
102. Id. at 27-28, 701 S.E.2d at 512-13.
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executed by all three men.103 The operating agreements provided that
"a member could be involuntarily withdrawn from the LLC" upon the
entering of a final divorce decree that required the owner to transfer an
ownership interest in the LLC to his spouse.'o4 The operating agreements also contained merger clauses, "which provided that the agreement[s] 'constitute[d] the complete . .. agreement among the members'
and .

. .

'supersedeld] all prior .

.

. statement[s] ....

A few months after signing the operating agreements, Romagnoli and
Penn notified Giacomantonio that his divorce decree from 2005 (which
required providing his ex-wife an interest in any ownership acquired
within three years of the final divorce decree) triggered the involuntary
withdrawal provisions in the operating agreements because the divorce
decree entitled his wife to an ownership interest in the two companies
he sold prior to the divorce. Giacomantonio then filed suit against
Romagnoli and Penn, alleging that the two men had committed fraud
and breach of fiduciary duty by misrepresenting the provisions of the
operating agreements to him.'06 The trial court ruled in favor of
Romagnoli and Penn, and the court of appeals affirmed. 07
The court of appeals found the operating agreements valid and
enforceable, barring Giacomantonio's tort claims because the operating
agreements contained merger clauses.'" The court referenced Ekeledo
v. Amporful,'o in which the Georgia Supreme Court asserted that a
party's claim of fraud will fail when that party affirms a contract with
a merger clause and retains the benefits because "[that party] is
estopped from asserting that [it] relied upon the other party's misrepresentation[s]" when entering the contract.'
This bars all tort claims
based upon the alleged precontract misrepresentations, "including claims
for breach of fiduciary duty.""' Giacomantonio's election to affirm the
operating agreements and all of the benefits thereof also affirmed the
merger clauses contained in the agreements, barring him from asserting
any tort claims for any precontract representations that contradicted the
provisions in the operating agreement.112

103.

Id. at 28, 701 S.E.2d at 513.

104. Id.
105. Id. (second and third alteration in original).
106. Id. at 29, 701 S.E.2d at 513.
107. Id. at 35, 701 S.E.2d at 516.
108. Id. at 31-32, 701 S.E.2d at 515-16.
109. 281 Ga. 817, 642 S.E.2d 20 (2007).
110. Giacomantonio,306 Ga. App. at 31, 701 S.E.2d at 515 (third alteration in original)
(quoting Ekeledo, 281 Ga. at 819, 642 S.E.2d at 22).
111. Id. at 32, 701 S.E.2d at 515.
112. Id. at 32, 701 S.E.2d at 515-16.
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B. Georgia Court of Appeals Holds that Dissolution of a Limited
Liability Company is Proper Where the Members Are Unable to
Operate the Business in Conformity with the Company's Operating
Agreement
In Simmons Family Properties, LLLP v. Shelton,"' the court of
appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiffs'
petition to dissolve DDE Properties, LLC (DDE).1" DDE was formed
in 2005 by Donnie Shelton, Edward G. Johnson, and Simmons Family
Properties, LLLP (SFP) and governed by an operating agreement that
granted each owner an equal one-third interest in DDE." 5 In 2008,
Shelton and Johnson filed a petition to dissolve DDE pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 14-11-603,116 which provides that the court may grant a
member's application to dissolve a company "whenever it is not
reasonably practicable to carry on the company's business in conformity
with the articles of organization or a written operating agreement."117
Shelton and Johnson alleged that because the sole manager of SFP,
Danny Simmons, never called an annual meeting, as required by DDE's
operating agreement, and failed to attend the special meeting called by
Johnson and Shelton to achieve a quorum, "it was not reasonably
practicable to carry on (DDE's] business."1 s SFP opposed the petition
for dissolution and filed a motion to compel arbitration to handle the
dissolution issue pursuant to DDE's operating agreement.1 9
The trial court rejected the motion to compel arbitration, and the court
of appeals affirmed.'20 The court of appeals ruled that, although the
operating agreement contained an arbitration provision for disputes
"aris[ingl out of, in connection with[,l or relat[ing] to the terms of the
operating agreement[,]" it did not apply in this petition because Johnson
and Shelton pursued a different means of obtaining dissolution (via
O.C.G.A. § 14-11-603), rather than the method discussed in the
operating agreement."' Thus, the arbitration provision did not apply,
and the court could determine the petition for dissolution.

113. 307 Ga. App. 361, 705 S.E.2d 258 (2010).
114. Id. at 361, 705 S.E.2d at 259.
115. Id.
116. O.C.G.A. § 14-11-603 (2003 & Supp. 2011).
117. Simmons Family Props., 307 Ga. App. at 361-62, 705 S.E.2d at 259; see also
O.C.G.A. § 14-11-603.
118. Simmons Family Props., 307 Ga. App. at 362, 705 S.E.2d at 259.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 363-64, 705 S.E.2d at 260.
122. Id. at 364, 705 S.E.2d at 260.
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In affirming the trial court's decision to grant the petition for
dissolution, the court of appeals rejected SFP's argument that the lack
of meetings constituted merely a technical violation of the operating
agreement and did not prevent the company from carrying on its
business. 123 Because annual meetings are the opportunity for members to have their voices heard and contribute to the direction of the
company, the lack of meetings constituted "more than a formality" and
24
contributed to the current deadlock among the members of DDE.1 As
a result, the trial court determined, and the court of appeals affirmed,
that it was "not reasonably practicable for DDE to carry on business in
conformity with the operating agreement" and, therefore, granted the
petition to dissolve DDE.125
IV.

PARTNERSHIPS

A. Foreign Limited Liability PartnershipMust Qualify to Do
Business in Georgia in Order to Bring a Suit in Georgia Courts
In Westmoreland v. Jordan Partners, LLLP,"' the court of appeals
held that a foreign limited liability partnership could not maintain its
action because it failed to obtain a certificate of authority to transact
business in Georgia. 2 7 Jordan Partners LLLP (Jordan Partners), an
Arizona limited liability limited partnership, brought an action against
Michael Westmoreland for installing utility lines across the property of
Jordan Partners without its permission. The trial court ruled in Jordan
Partners favor.'2 8 Westmoreland argued that its motion to dismiss
should have been granted because Jordan Partners was a foreign limited
liability partnership not authorized to transact business in Georgia and,
29
thus, could not maintain this suit.1
The court of appeals agreed with Westmoreland and reversed the trial
court's decision."' Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-8-54(a)a' "[a] foreign
limited liability partnership transacting business in [Georgia] may not
maintain an action, suit, or proceeding in a [Georgia] court .

.

. until it

is authorized to transact business in [Georgia]" by obtaining a certificate

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 364-65, 705 S.E.2d at 260-61.
Id. at 365, 705 S.E.2d at 261 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
306 Ga. App. 575, 703 S.E.2d 39 (2010).
Id. at 575-76, 703 S.E.2d at 40-41; see also O.C.G.A. § 14-8-54(a) (2003).
Westmoreland, 306 Ga. App. at 575, 703 S.E.2d at 40.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 14-8-54(a) (2003).
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of authority.1 3 2 The trial court relied on Health Horizons, Inc. v. State

Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.'33 as authority for denying

Westmoreland's motion to dismiss.1 34 In Health Horizons, the court of
appeals did not grant a motion to dismiss because although a foreign
corporation had failed to obtain a certificate of authority at the time it
filed the complaint, it had obtained a certificate by the time the motion
to dismiss was filed.'" However, in Westmoreland, Jordan Partners
still did not have a certificate of authority at the time the motion to
dismiss was filed.'"' Jordan Partners argued that because it was not
"transacting business" in Georgia, it did not need to obtain a certificate
of authority.13 The trial court disagreed, finding that Jordan Partners
was transacting business; however, the court did not grant the motion
to dismiss.1 3 8 The court of appeals reversed, holding that, while the
trial court was correct in determining Jordan Partners was transacting
business in Georgia, it erred in disregarding the statute by denying
Westmoreland's motion to dismiss.

B. A Court Will Not Grant a Petition for Dissolution of a Limited
PartnershipSimply Because the Petitioner Cannot Obtain
Management Control of the Partnershipfrom the Other Partners
In Valone v. Valone,'4 0 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia granted the defendant's motion to dismiss
plaintiff's petition for dissolution.' 4 ' The plaintiff, Thomas Valone
(Thomas), sought the dissolution of Bomeg Limited Partnership (Bomeg),
of which he was a general partner, along with his two siblings and the
two trusts established by his parents for which his siblings were the
trustees (the siblings and trusts together constituting the defendants in
this case). Each trust held a forty-nine percent interest in Bomeg, and
the three siblings each held a two-thirds of one percent interest.
Thomas petitioned the district court to dissolve Bomeg under Georgia
law because Bomeg had not made an annual profit distribution since
2004, but Thomas continued to incur tax liability with no hope of

132.
54(a).
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Westmoreland, 306 Ga. App. at 575, 703 S.E.2d at 40; see also O.C.G.A. § 14-8239 Ga. App. 440, 521 S.E.2d 383 (1999).
Westmoreland, 306 Ga. App. at 575, 703 S.E.2d at 40.
Health Horizons, 239 Ga. App. at 443, 521 S.E.2d at 386.
Westmoreland, 306 Ga. App. at 575, 703 S.E.2d at 40.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 575-76, 703 S.E.2d at 40-41.
No. 10-CV-0617-RWS, 2010 WL 4437076 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2010).
Id. at *5.
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receiving distributions from Bomeg due to the defendants' control of the
partnership.'4 2
The test for dissolution of a limited partnership under Georgia law is
whether "it is 'not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in
conformity with the partnership agreement."" 4 3 No Georgia court had
ever interpreted that language, which is identical to that found in
section 802 of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA);144 therefore, the district court reviewed how other RULPA jurisdictions interpreted such language to ensure uniformity among states
that have adopted RULPA."' The court noted that other RULPA
jurisdictions have found the relevant inquiry in a dissolution action to
be whether a for-profit business is capable of operating at a profit,
considering tension among the partners as one part of the analysis. 46
Bomeg's business was the "acquisition, retention [,] and disposition of any
type of property for business or investment purposes," so the relevant
inquiry in this case was whether Thomas provided a sufficient factual
basis for the district court to conclude that Bomeg could not possibly
continue to accomplish that purpose.'4 7
The district court determined that the evidence in the record led to the
opposite conclusion, as Bomeg's business appeared to be doing quite well
and the tension among the partners was not causing any breakdown in
the operation of the business. 4 ' The inability of Thomas to exercise
managerial control did not merit dissolution of the partnership, and
because Thomas "has not pointed to any facts showing that the conflict
among the parties would impact Bomeg's ability to continue operating
at a profit, [Thomas] fail[ed] to state a cause of action for dissolution
under Georgia law."l4 9 The district court granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss.150

142. Id. at *1.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at *2; O.C.G.A. § 14-9-802(1) (2003).
REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 802, 6B U.L.A. 328 (2008).
Valone, 2010 WL 4437076, at *2.
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *4.

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at *5.
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AGENCY

A. A Note and Security Deed are Not Enforceable Against a Church
That Did Not Authorize the ransactionEven Though the Church
Enjoyed the Benefits of the Loan
In Macedonia Baptist Church of Atlanta v. LIB Properties, Ltd.,1"'
the Georgia Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's ruling
regarding whether a security deed and loan note executed by a church
member were valid and enforceable against the church.152 In this case,
Macedonia Baptist Church of Atlanta (MBCA) brought suit against LIB
Properties, Ltd. (LIB), Macedonia Baptist Church of Atlanta, Inc.
(MBCA, Inc.), and church members Scottie L. Cousins and Alan Moon.
MBCA claimed that Cousins and Moon incorporated MBCA, Inc. without
authority and that Cousins signed documents as president of MBCA, Inc.
by which the corporation gave LIB a loan note for $202,500 and a
security deed over real property owned by MBCA. LIB filed a counterclaim against MBCA seeking a declaratory judgment validating the note
and the security deed."5
In January 2007, the church pastor authorized Cousins, a mortgage
broker and employee of the church, to seek and obtain offers for A new
mortgage loan for the church, thereby giving Cousins access to church
financial records for such purpose. That same month, Cousins contacted
LIB for a loan, representing that he was acting on behalf of the church
as pastor and as president of MBCA, Inc., which he incorporated earlier
that month as a new corporation. The church previously used the name
MBCA, Inc. for its nonprofit corporation, which was administratively
dissolved in 2005 for failure to pay its annual fees.'
LIB made the
loan to MBCA, Inc. in March 2007 based on loan documents, note, and
security deed "signed by Cousins as the president of . .. MBCA, Inc."' 5
LIB entered into the transaction with Cousins and MBCA, Inc. despite
the fact that a title search of the property securing the note revealed no
deed transferring the property from the previously dissolved MBCA, Inc.
to the new MBCA, Inc. entering into the transaction."' LIB concluded
that the "[dissolved] MBCA, Inc. and the [niew MBCA, Inc. were one and

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

307 Ga. App. 760, 707 S.E.2d 380 (2011).
Id. at 760, 707 S.E.2d at 381.
Id. at 760-61, 707 S.E.2d at 381.
Id. at 761, 707 S.E.2d at 381.
Id. at 762, 707 S.E.2d at 382.
Id.
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the same corporation," despite the fact that the corporations had
different officers and a different address.157
LIB contended that MBCA was bound by the note and security deed
"because (1) it authorized its agent, Cousins, to enter into the loan
transaction on its behalf, or (2) it subsequently ratified the loan
transaction made on its behalf by its agent, Cousins, who acted without
The court of appeals rejected LIB's first argument
authority."'
because, while there was evidence that MBCA authorized Cousins to
pursue offers for a mortgage loan, "there [was] no evidence that MBCA
.

.

. authorized Cousins to enter into a loan transaction on its be-

half.""' Additionally, Cousins did not enter into the loan transaction
on behalf of MBCA but on behalf of MBCA, Inc., and no evidence showed
that MBCA authorized Cousins to incorporate MBCA, Inc. or represent
that it controlled the church and its property.'
Regarding the second argument, the court noted ratification may only
occur if the act was done on behalf of the person adopting it and
attempting to ratify it.'' Because Cousins was not acting on behalf
of MBCA, but rather in his capacity as president of MBCA, Inc., ratification by MBCA was not possible. 62 Even though MBCA accepted the
benefits of the loan by using the proceeds to pay off a previous mortgage
and overdue property taxes, it was not bound by the note or the security
deed.' 6 ' Therefore, the court of appeals overturned the decision of the
trial court by determining that MBCA was not "bound under principles
of agency or ratification to the terms of the . . . note and security

deed."164

B. A Hospital is Not Responsible for the Negligence of a Doctor
Without Control of the Time, Manner, and Method of the Doctor's
Work
In Pendley v. Southern Regional Health System, Inc.,16 a mother
sued a hospital for medical malpractice that resulted in the death of her
son.'66 At issue in the case was whether the treating physician was
an employee of the hospital, as a hospital can only be held liable for the
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id. at 763, 707 S.E.2d at 382.
Id.
Id. at 763, 707 S.E.2d at 383.
Id. at 763-64, 707 S.E.2d at 383.
Id. at 764, 707 S.E.2d at 383.
Id.
Id.
307 Ga. App. 82, 704 S.E.2d 198 (2010).
Id. at 82-83, 704 S.E.2d at 199-200.
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acts of a doctor when it is shown that the doctor is an employee, not an
independent contractor, of the hospital.167
The court of appeals applied the factors discussed in Cooper v.
6 because the cause of action arose prior to February 16, 2005
Binion,"'
(the legislature enacted a new code provision to cover these kinds of
causes of action that arose after that date), 69 to determine whether
the treating physician was an employee of Southern Regional Health
Although the treating physician
System, Inc. (Southern Regional).'
used the hospital's dictation equipment and was required to be at the
hospital at the time the son was admitted, this was not enough evidence
to overcome Southern Regional's motion for summary judgment because
it did not create an issue of fact as to whether the hospital controlled the
time, manner, or method of the physician's work."'
The mother also argued that the treating physician was an apparent
or ostensible agent of Southern Regional, which exists when a person
represents that another person is their agent and causes a third party
to justifiably rely on the care or skill of that apparent agent.17 2 In
such a scenario, that person is liable to the third party for any harm
caused by the apparent agent as if the apparent agent were the actual
agent."' In Pendley, there was nothing in the record to indicate that
the treating physician indicated to the mother or son that he was an
employee of the hospital. 4 Also, the hospital utilized waiver forms
(which the mother signed on behalf of the son) with conspicuous
disclaimers that made clear that many of the doctors at the hospital
167. Id. at 85,704 S.E.2d at 201 (quoting Cooper v. Binion, 266 Ga. App. 709, 710, 598
S.E.2d 6, 8 (2004), superceded by statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5.1(f)-(g) (Supp. 2011), as
recognized in, Blackmon v. Tenet Healthsystem Spalding, 288 Ga. App. 137, 139 n.7, 653
S.E.2d 333, 338 n.7 (2007), rev'd on other grounds, 284 Ga. 369, 667 S.E.2d 348 (2008)).
168. 266 Ga. App. 709, 598 S.E.2d 6 (2004).
169. See O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5.1 (f)-(g) (Supp. 2011).
170. Pendley, 307 Ga. App. at 85, 704 S.E.2d at 201.
These factors are: (a) The right to direct the physician's work step-by-stepl;] ...
(b) Contracts to perform a service rather than accomplish a task[;] . .. (c) The
right of the hospital to inspect the physician's work[;] . . . (d) The supplier of the
equipment[;] . . . (e) The nature or skill of the physician's work[;] ...

(f) The

hospital's right to control the physician's time[;] . . . (g) The method of payment[;]
(h) [The right to choose which patients to treat[;] . .. (i) Physician spends all
working hours at hospital;1 . .. (j) The method of billing the patients[; and] ...
(k) Payments for medical malpractice insurance.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Cooper, 266 Ga. App. at 710-13, 598 S.E.2d at 9-11).
171. Id. at 86-87, 704 S.E.2d at 201-02.
172. Id. at 87, 704 S.E.2d at 202 (quoting Cooper, 266 Ga. App. at 714, 598 S.E.2d at
11).
173. Id. (quoting Cooper, 266 Ga. App. at 714, 598 S.E.2d at 11).
174. Id. at 87, 704 S.E.2d at 202-03.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

104

[Vol. 63

were independent contractors and, therefore, not agents of the hospital.'7 ' Taking both of these pieces of evidence together, the court of
appeals determined that the trial court's grant of summary judgment on
this issue was appropriate.'7 1
VI. LEGISLATION
During the 2011 session of the Georgia General Assembly, a number
of revisions were made to the O.C.G.A., including revisions to Title 7
with respect to dissolution of financial institutions and licensing
requirements for mortgage lenders and brokers,"' Title 13 with
respect to restrictive covenants in contracts,178 and Title 14 with
respect to application fees for reinstatement of corporations and limited
liability companies and "the execution of instruments by corporations
conveying

. . .

real property [interests] or releasing security agree-

ments."'79
Title 7 was amended to (1) "provide the Department of Banking and
Finance the power to require dissolution of a financial institution" in
certain situations, (2) revise definitions, (3) provide an effective date for
licensing of mortgage lenders and mortgage brokers, and (4) provide for
the administration of a nation-wide system for licensing mortgage
lenders and mortgage brokers.8 o
With respect to Title 14, Senate Bill 64 increased the fee for an
application for reinstatement relating to business corporations,'8 1
and limited liability companies. 8 3 It also
nonprofit corporations,
relaxed the requirement for a corporate seal execution of instruments
conveying real property interests or releasing security agreements.'8
In arguably the most significant event of the legislative session in
terms of contract law, Title 13 was amended in an important way by
providing for the enforcement of contracts restricting or prohibiting
competition in certain commercial agreements and allowing certain other

175.

Id. at 84, 87-88, 704 S.E.2d at 200, 203.

176. Id.
177. Ga. H.R. Bill 239, Reg. Sess. (2011) (codified in scattered sections of O.C.G.A. tit.
7, ch. 1 (Supp. 2011)).
178. Ga. H.R. Bill 30, Reg. Sess. (2011) (codified in scattered sections of O.C.G.A. tit.
13, ch. 8 (Supp. 2011)).

179. Ga. S. Bill 64, pmbl., Reg. Sess. (2011) (codified in scattered chapters of O.C.G.A.
tit. 14 (Supp. 2011)).
180. Ga. H.R. Bill 239, pmbl.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Ga. S. Bill 64 §
Id. § 3 (codified
Id. § 8 (codified
Id. § 5 (codified

1 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 14-2-122(12) (Supp. 2011)).
at O.C.G.A. § 14-3-122(11) (Supp. 2011)).
at O.C.G.A. § 14-11-1101(16) (Supp. 2011)).
at O.C.G.A. § 14-5-7(a) (Supp. 2011)).
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restrictive covenants in contract.l" The purpose behind this change
was to supersede the outdated procedure of allowing the courts, through
case law rather than statute, to determine a constitutionally enforceable
"restraint of trade," which could increase the attraction of new business
to Georgia."'
This new law"' allows courts to "blue pencil" or modify a restrictive
covenant they deem to be overbroad or unreasonable, instead of deeming
The new law also provides
the entire covenant unenforceable."
guidance regarding the scope of restrictive covenants that will be deemed
Instead of being tied to the physical location where an
enforceable.'
employee worked, a noncompete provision may now extend to the area
where the employer does business (so long as such area is reasonable)
or may list specific competitors of an employer for whom the employee
cannot provide services."'o The law also provides that instead of or in
addition to a noncompete provision, an employer may utilize a customer
nonsolicitation provision, which provides that a former employee is
prohibited from soliciting business on behalf of a competitor from
customers of the former employer "with whom the employee had
Regarding time limitations, the new law
material contact . . . .""
provides a rebuttable presumption that a two-year limitation for
noncompete and nonsolicit provisions in an employment agreement will
be reasonable."' Further, nondisclosure provisions seeking to prevent
the disclosure of an employer's confidential information or trade secrets
need not have a time limitation and may continue so long as the
Finally, the new law
information in question remains confidential.'
applies only to employees with sensitive business information that

185. Ga. H.R. Bill 30 § 4 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-50 to -59 (Supp. 2011)).
186. See id. §§ 2, 4.
187. During the 2010 legislative session, the General Assembly enacted House
Resolution 178, the constitutional amendment necessary for the statutory language of the
bill. Ga. H.R. Res. 178, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 1260. Georgia voters ratified the
constitutional amendment on November 2, 2010. Ga. H.R. Bill 30 § 1. Several questions
emerged about the validity of House Resolution 178, so House Bill 30 was introduced to
reenact the substantive provisions of House Resolution 178 and put to rest all questions
of its validity. Id.
188. Id. § 4 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 13-8-54(b) (Supp. 2011)). Although House Bill 30
was enacted, in part, to remove confusion regarding the effective date of House Bill 173,
there remains considerable debate regarding whether the law became effective on
November 3, 2010, January 1, 2011, or May 11, 2011.
189. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53 (Supp. 2011)).
190. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 13-8-56(2) (Supp. 2011)).
191. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(b) (Supp. 2011)).
192. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(a)-(b) (Supp. 2011)).
193. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(e) (Supp. 2011)).
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warrants protection, so employees without access to such information are
not subject to restrictive covenants governed by the new law.'

194. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(5)(B) (Supp. 2011)).

